> things can and have changed fast in both directions. The future is malleable.
Accepting the analysis regarding the Baby Boom & The Second Demographic Transition, it looks like two major shifts would have to happen in North America for a significant increase of TFR:
- a sharp rise in the income ratio of young men vs. young women
- the abolishment of no-fault divorce as a socio-legal policy
Such a change in income ratio can happen in two ways:
1) employment levels of the sexes remain the same, but (young) men's wages sharply rise relative to (young) women
2) employment levels of (young) women sharply drop compared to (young) men
Even if one leaves out the legal/political resistance to either of those very retrograde changes in the labor market, why would for-profit private industry employers implement either of them? It is likely that work productivity of young unmarried/childless men & women are similar, at least in white collar & light industry jobs.
Significantly different levels of wages couldn't be justified: no one would offer double the salary to a man if they could get a woman to do the same job (produce the same amount of goods/services) for half the money.
Similarly, no one (or very few) would refuse to employ a woman in a particular job (even if it weren't illegal): it's in the employer's interest to hire anyone who can do the job.
The abolishment of no-fault divorce would require legislative action. As some 85% of divorce petitions are filed by women, the already existing political polarization of the sexes would fuel extremely divisive political fights in state legislatures over the issue.
The level of societal support -- including the passive kind -- which existed for the introduction of no-fault divorce is unlikely to exist for the repeal of it; it would take a major shift in societal attitudes regarding marriage/divorce to make such legislative changes feasible.
The future is malleable, but the extent of its malleability isn't unbounded.
Strong, well-researched article. Thesis of the causes is good as well, however I think you are understating the effect of economics in the latter half - you correctly note the impact of neolocality and of the baby boom, but neglect to touch upon the energy crisis of the 1970s and the rise in fiat currency.
Both effectively supressed growth in wages for males and encouraged female entry to the office workplace, significantly contributing to the highlighted patterns. Despite the improving conditions in the first half of 2000s, the subsequent financial crash and unsustainable economy that carried on until now have done little to furnish the Western man with the income and stability needed to return to above-replacement fertility. More than other civilisations, Europeans and Americans are sensitive to economic conditions in family planning.
Great article! I'm not sure I agree with your statement that "very few people saw any of these changes coming before they happened." In the 1980s, many demographers in Quebec and France were predicting that fertility would continue to fall well below the replacement level (e.g., Jacques Henripin, Georges Matthews).
The baby boom was made possible by policies that prevailed throughout the postwar era: high rate of unionization, low rate of immigration, economic protectionism, and inexpensive education, as well as explicit and implicit pro-natalist propaganda in the media. All of those policies were undone from the late 1960s onward.
Do you think this demographic vacuum will be filled by fertile subcultures? By this, I mean religious sects like the Amish, the Hassidim, and the Mormons.
An excellent - easily digestible - simplified demographic history of (mainly) the Western world. What would be equally interesting would be a similarly readable account of why such a disproportionate % of the world's population is concentrated in South Asia.
The culture and attitudes of a very different past are still within living memory - my mother often remarks how strong the taboo around childlessness, illegitimacy (bastardism) and single motherhood was when she was a child in the 1960s - these are effectively non-existent in 2025.
"Divorce...not only does this reduce marriage rates and increase divorce rates (lowering nuptiality), but the lack of security also encourages spouses to invest more in themselves (via education or career) and less in specialization of labor or relationship capital, including children, because said investments can be zeroed out at any time (lowering marital fertility)."
The only people willing to make massive investments in the relationship are those absolutely sure the investment won't be lost. This is why it's mostly only religious groups still having large families.
I'm also curious how much of a productivity hit has been caused by the loss of family specialization of labor. In my family my wife is the woman and so she's gotten REALLY good at tasks traditionally given to women. This isn't just stuff like cleaning the house, but jobs like creating medicines, cooking, management, education, etc. In poor marriages those jobs are done poorly by both parties, or done poorly by third parties, which means more resources must be committed to get the same benefit.
Could be a contributing cause to massive health and education spending.
Right, these changes happened quickly. But it's partially a story of rapid technological change and how the second-order effects of technological change can be hard to predict (e.g "Social media was supposed to connect us!")
To see a pro-natalist cultural swing, there likely needs to be some sort of technological tailwind--something that increases the status of the average man compared to the average woman. But it's hard to see where that would come from. The two most obvious world-changing technologies on the horizon--AGI and embryo selection/gene-editing--plausibly increase the status of high-status men relative to women, but not average men relative to women. War has historically raised the status of (surviving) men, but that would be a case where the cure would be worse than the disease.
My current position is that the current technological changes on the horizon are going to make all of the fertility talk kind of moot.
" The two most obvious world-changing technologies on the horizon--AGI and embryo selection/gene-editing--plausibly increase the status of high-status men relative to women, but not average men relative to women."
Excellent points on embryo selection/gene editing. I would also add genetic enhancement for positive human traits.
Excellent piece.
> things can and have changed fast in both directions. The future is malleable.
Accepting the analysis regarding the Baby Boom & The Second Demographic Transition, it looks like two major shifts would have to happen in North America for a significant increase of TFR:
- a sharp rise in the income ratio of young men vs. young women
- the abolishment of no-fault divorce as a socio-legal policy
Such a change in income ratio can happen in two ways:
1) employment levels of the sexes remain the same, but (young) men's wages sharply rise relative to (young) women
2) employment levels of (young) women sharply drop compared to (young) men
Even if one leaves out the legal/political resistance to either of those very retrograde changes in the labor market, why would for-profit private industry employers implement either of them? It is likely that work productivity of young unmarried/childless men & women are similar, at least in white collar & light industry jobs.
Significantly different levels of wages couldn't be justified: no one would offer double the salary to a man if they could get a woman to do the same job (produce the same amount of goods/services) for half the money.
Similarly, no one (or very few) would refuse to employ a woman in a particular job (even if it weren't illegal): it's in the employer's interest to hire anyone who can do the job.
The abolishment of no-fault divorce would require legislative action. As some 85% of divorce petitions are filed by women, the already existing political polarization of the sexes would fuel extremely divisive political fights in state legislatures over the issue.
The level of societal support -- including the passive kind -- which existed for the introduction of no-fault divorce is unlikely to exist for the repeal of it; it would take a major shift in societal attitudes regarding marriage/divorce to make such legislative changes feasible.
The future is malleable, but the extent of its malleability isn't unbounded.
Kind of a change for you. You argued with me insistently that all was lost for Western Civilization because of the low birth rate on Noah Carl's article https://www.aporiamagazine.com/p/yes-youre-going-to-be-replaced
& here I'm arguing that it is unlikely that the TFR will recover in the foreseeable future in North America. No change.
Strong, well-researched article. Thesis of the causes is good as well, however I think you are understating the effect of economics in the latter half - you correctly note the impact of neolocality and of the baby boom, but neglect to touch upon the energy crisis of the 1970s and the rise in fiat currency.
Both effectively supressed growth in wages for males and encouraged female entry to the office workplace, significantly contributing to the highlighted patterns. Despite the improving conditions in the first half of 2000s, the subsequent financial crash and unsustainable economy that carried on until now have done little to furnish the Western man with the income and stability needed to return to above-replacement fertility. More than other civilisations, Europeans and Americans are sensitive to economic conditions in family planning.
The fertility crisis is too global and too steadfast over the last sixty years to attribute to specific shocks like energy crisis and fiat currency.
Great article! I'm not sure I agree with your statement that "very few people saw any of these changes coming before they happened." In the 1980s, many demographers in Quebec and France were predicting that fertility would continue to fall well below the replacement level (e.g., Jacques Henripin, Georges Matthews).
The baby boom was made possible by policies that prevailed throughout the postwar era: high rate of unionization, low rate of immigration, economic protectionism, and inexpensive education, as well as explicit and implicit pro-natalist propaganda in the media. All of those policies were undone from the late 1960s onward.
Do you think this demographic vacuum will be filled by fertile subcultures? By this, I mean religious sects like the Amish, the Hassidim, and the Mormons.
Fascinating. I had no idea birthrates were so low prior to the world wars. Renewal seems possible again; I've read too many doomer predictions.
None of this had to happen. We committed suicide.
An excellent - easily digestible - simplified demographic history of (mainly) the Western world. What would be equally interesting would be a similarly readable account of why such a disproportionate % of the world's population is concentrated in South Asia.
Shocking article.
The culture and attitudes of a very different past are still within living memory - my mother often remarks how strong the taboo around childlessness, illegitimacy (bastardism) and single motherhood was when she was a child in the 1960s - these are effectively non-existent in 2025.
Very in-depth, thank you. This paragraph hit me:
"Divorce...not only does this reduce marriage rates and increase divorce rates (lowering nuptiality), but the lack of security also encourages spouses to invest more in themselves (via education or career) and less in specialization of labor or relationship capital, including children, because said investments can be zeroed out at any time (lowering marital fertility)."
The only people willing to make massive investments in the relationship are those absolutely sure the investment won't be lost. This is why it's mostly only religious groups still having large families.
I'm also curious how much of a productivity hit has been caused by the loss of family specialization of labor. In my family my wife is the woman and so she's gotten REALLY good at tasks traditionally given to women. This isn't just stuff like cleaning the house, but jobs like creating medicines, cooking, management, education, etc. In poor marriages those jobs are done poorly by both parties, or done poorly by third parties, which means more resources must be committed to get the same benefit.
Could be a contributing cause to massive health and education spending.
Right, these changes happened quickly. But it's partially a story of rapid technological change and how the second-order effects of technological change can be hard to predict (e.g "Social media was supposed to connect us!")
To see a pro-natalist cultural swing, there likely needs to be some sort of technological tailwind--something that increases the status of the average man compared to the average woman. But it's hard to see where that would come from. The two most obvious world-changing technologies on the horizon--AGI and embryo selection/gene-editing--plausibly increase the status of high-status men relative to women, but not average men relative to women. War has historically raised the status of (surviving) men, but that would be a case where the cure would be worse than the disease.
My current position is that the current technological changes on the horizon are going to make all of the fertility talk kind of moot.
" The two most obvious world-changing technologies on the horizon--AGI and embryo selection/gene-editing--plausibly increase the status of high-status men relative to women, but not average men relative to women."
Excellent points on embryo selection/gene editing. I would also add genetic enhancement for positive human traits.
Excellent informative article with an intelligent, measured conclusion.