This is an interesting take. My issue with Haidt's example is that probabilistic concerns are legitimate. If someone made a baby play one round of Russian roulette and the baby lived and was amused by the clicking noise of an empty chamber, there is no harm, but there could've been. Similarly, there is likely to be harm with Julie and Mark.

I don't think that all ethical concerns reduce down to harm. I think that bodily violations are immoral even if there is no harm. But defending this position takes a long time and it's seems on its face weird, but I think it's defensible.

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I think the bucket of harm would expand to capture any negative consequences you want to throw in there. If we use synonyms (rather than words heavily philosophised), this seems to become more obvious: damage for example. Unfairness is wrong because it's damaging, as is a lack of loyalty, or some purity violation. The dyadic template of a patient and a victim seems to be the right cognitive framework. Any violation must surely trigger a damage detector. We then use culturally-loaded language to convince ourselves that there's more going on than simple psychological or physical damage. There often is, of course. But all the other violations have to, by definition, rest atop harm. Haidt's framework is good anthropology. It's not good cognitive science or moral philosophy.

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