Values, Voice, and Virtue

Well-written and cogently argued, Matt Goodwin’s new book, “Values, Voice, and Virtue: The New British Politics” tells the British version of a story familiar to those of us in the United States.

Written by Bo Winegard.

Well-written and cogently argued, Matt Goodwin’s new book, “Values, Voice, and Virtue: The New British Politics” tells the British version of a story familiar to those of us in the United States. 

In 2016, Donald Trump, a brash and boorish businessman with little knowledge of or respect for traditional conservativism, defied prevailing political wisdom all the way to the White House, revealing an angry and divided country more deeply polarized than pundits had imagined. His pugilistic populism appealed to many ordinary people who felt that the elite had become haughty and out-of-touch promoters of alien values. This same pugilism horrified the elite, who saw his victory as a baleful omen, a warning of a potentially imminent cataclysm.

Across the Atlantic, according to Goodwin’s book, politics have been similarly fractious: “British politics is coming apart,” he writes early in the book. And they are coming apart in Britain for many of the same reasons they are coming apart in America: A new elite has replaced an old elite and is divorced from the values of ordinary people, who therefore feel alienated and embittered. Standard economic concerns and transactional politics have diminished in importance and identity politics have increased: “Politics, in short, has moved from the old transactional debates about what we have to the far more existential debates about who we are.”

A growing divide between traditionalists and cosmopolitans has become more conspicuous and more rancorous. The revolution that led to this cleavage traces back at least to the late 70s and runs through 2016: 

Beginning in 1979 and then accelerating until 2016, this deeply transformative and highly destabilizing project overhauled Britain in three ways. It opened the economy to a new and very disruptive model of hyper-​­globalization. It opened the country’s borders to a new and unprecedented era of mass immigration. And it opened up and hollowed out its national democracy, handing much greater power, influence and control to supranational institutions.

This too sounds quite familiar to those of us in the United States, who would associate it with the neoliberal revolution (or the Reagan revolution). In America, it birthed Trump; in Britain it birthed Nigel Farage, Brexit, and Boris Johnson. But in both countries, it created the same division between cosmopolitans and traditionalists, between the local and global, between the parochial and the ecumenical. 

Goodwin’s strength is not novel analysis. This is no knock on him. Novelty is often a distracting bauble; it attracts attention but is commonly wrong. Instead, Goodwin’s strength is simple but sympathetic analysis. He understands the broad forces that spurred the surprising changes and tumult in the politics of the West, and he writes about them without villainizing or heroizing. 

Those who are less sympathetic to populism may quibble with this claim. They might contend that whereas Goodwin’s book “National Populism” was dispassionate, “Values, Voice, and Virtue” is partisan, for Goodwin clearly relates to and sides with the traditionalists. But this, I think, reflects the slanted coverage of the populist revolution from the mainstream media more than Goodwin’s own biases. What Goodwin urges is that pundits and journalists refrain from derogatory depictions of populist voters as ignorant bumpkins:

Rather than see Brexit as a historic turning point in which millions of people sought to reassert their values and voice against a system which has excluded them for decades, some writers prefer to portray their fellow citizens as mindless, irrational, ignorant lemmings who are being pushed around from one election to the next by lies, misinformation and post-truth politics.

He does not suggest that populists are infallible or always morally righteous; he merely believes that they represent an hitherto ignored constituency of voters whose anger is rational:

But while this new ruling class dismisses this backlash as an outpouring of racism, ignorance or imperial nostalgia, in reality it marks a rational response to how the new elite have consolidated their power, coalescing into a closely connected, insular and self-serving ruling class who have turned their back on many people, no longer representing or respecting their views.

Although all of this is probably familiar to readers who have been captivated, thrilled, or horrified by the populist revolutions of the West, it is still important, especially because many liberal elites remain hostile to the many manifestations of populist anger, whether Brexit or Trump or DeSantis. And they persistently misunderstand its underlying motivations because they see it more as an inexplicable evil than as rational response to a radically changing world.

This misunderstanding is unfortunate for a variety of reasons, of course, not least of which is that the political turbulence caused by the divide between cosmopolitan elites and many ordinary voters will likely not abate anytime soon. As Goodwin writes:

When we look at the new politics through a wide lens, we see that the rise of national populism, Brexit, and Boris Johnson’s very different brand of post-Brexit conservatism were not just powered by the latest news cycle, policies, leaders or campaigns. Instead, they all tapped into a much deeper, longer-running and intensifying counter-revolution again the new elite, which has been building for decades and may still have a long way to run.

The same is likely true in the United States. The rift between the new elite and other people, though easy to exaggerate, is large and shows little sign of shrinking. This makes Matt Goodwin’s book a crucial one to read. To understand where we are going, we must understand where we are and how we got here. Fairy tales about noble liberals fighting desperately to defeat the monsters of authoritarianism and intolerance will not help, even if they flatter the egos of those who think they are on the side of the angels.

Goodwin’s book is not flawless, and one who does not share his priorities or sympathies could easily have written a book about the same underlying social and political changes with a much more critical attitude toward the populist backlash and the voters who will continue to sustain it. On the other hand, plenty of books have been written from such a critical perspective, so it’s always good to have a compassionate and judicious one written from the other side. 

“Values, Voice, and Virtue” is engaging and limpid and should provoke needed debate and discussion. It’s like a short, humble, but well-directed film: It’s not aiming for an Oscar, and it won’t top the box office, but it will reward its readers with solid craftsmanship and prudent analysis.

Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics is published by Penguin.

Bo Winegard is the Executive Editor of Aporia.

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