Mass democracy does not create prosperity

There is no historical case of a country achieving economic development under conditions of mass democracy.

Written by Lipton Matthews.

It has become an article of faith in the West that democracy leads to development. According to this way of thinking, unless you give people the vote and open up political competition, prosperity will never arrive. Many well-intentioned governments and international organisations assume that free elections are not just morally necessary but economically advantageous. Yet this assumption is false. The evidence shows that introducing mass democracy into poor and fragile countries does not create prosperity. In fact, it often prevents it.

To begin with, there is no historical case of a country achieving economic development under conditions of mass democracy. Britain’s industrial revolution occurred at a time when the franchise was still very limited. As late as 1900, less than 20% of Britons could vote. The US, too, began its economic ascent long before universal suffrage, with broad segments of the population excluded from political life (slaves, women and many working-class men). Japan, Germany and South Korea all built up their economies under authoritarian rule. In each case, political liberalization came only after state institutions had been established, the economy had become diversified and a broad middle class had emerged. Democracy was not the engine of development. It was the outcome.

South Korea is an instructive example. In the decades following the Korean War, the country was among the poorest in the world. Its transformation began in the 1960s under a military regime that emphasized national development above all else. The government pursued aggressive industrialization, invested heavily in education and strongly promoted exports. Meanwhile, political dissent was limited and elections were largely meaningless. Yet the economy grew at a rapid pace. By the time democracy arrived in the late 1980s, South Korea had already undergone the structural changes necessary for it to succeed. The population was literate and the economy could sustain the demands of open politics.

This sequencing matters. When development precedes democratization, democracy tends to flourish. But when democratization precedes development, the opposite tends to happen. It isn’t just a matter of timing. Extending the vote to a population that is poor, uneducated and politically inexperienced can distort the very foundations of governance. Politicians prioritize rent-seeking over long-term development goals. As a result, clientelism becomes the norm, and state institutions falter.

Indeed, expanding the franchise too early can trap societies in a "weak state equilibrium". When most voters lack education and do not understand the political process, elections tend to reward candidates who promise immediate benefits—even at the expense of economic growth. Those who offer handouts and subsidies, or who make appeals based on identity, have a clear advantage over those who advocate sensible reforms. As a result, the state becomes an instrument of patronage. Accountability is eroded, institutions become politicised, and public money is diverted to interest groups. Once entrenched, this cycle is extremely difficult to break.

Some argue that democracies “learn” and get better over time. But this is the exception, rather than the rule. Institutions that have become politicized rarely self-correct. And in countries where democracy takes root before state capacity has been established, it actually weakens the state’s capacity to govern. Rather than providing a mandate to rule, elections become a zero-sum struggle for spoils.

A useful comparison can be made between Ghana and Benin, two West African countries that transitioned to democracy in the 1990s. Both are considered free by international standards and have maintained relatively high scores on democracy indexes for a number of years. Yet their post-democratization trajectories diverged. Ghana’s economy has grown steadily, while Benin’s has remained sluggish. Why? The difference lies in the conditions that obtained at the time of transition. Ghana had higher living standards and greater human capital: about 43 percent of adults there had completed secondary education, compared to less than 9 percent in Benin. What’s more, institutions in Ghana were better organized and the private sector had a larger role in shaping policy. It is no coincidence that Ghanaian democracy has been more successful—it was built on a stronger foundation.

Jamaica offers another case in point. It holds regular elections, has two major political parties, and enjoys a largely free press. On paper, it looks like a well-functioning democracy. But the reality is that voter turnout is low, political debates rarely deal with substantive policy, and parties often rely on material incentives to win votes. Speaking as a Jamaican, it is not uncommon for voters to be offered chicken or alcohol in exchange for their support. This kind of blatant clientelism is not a sideshow—it’s how the system operates. Serious reform is practically impossible in such an environment. Pork barrel politics became so entrenched in Jamaica that it was only under pressure from international organizations like the International Monetary Fund that the government produced a reasonably balanced budget.

Of course, countries’ ability to build and sustain democratic systems may be constrained by certain factors. Tatu Vanhanen argued that one such factor is the population’s average intelligence. In his view, democratic development is not a simple consequence of institutional design; it depends on the traits of voters and their elected leaders. Analysing data for 172 countries, he found a strong relationship between national IQ and the quality of democracy. He argued that this relationship is structural, not accidental: populations with lower intelligence are less able to cultivate the trust, institutions and long-term planning that democracy requires.

Another factor that may constrain countries' ability to build and sustain democracy is the practice of cousin marriage, which remains common in much of the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. As Michael Woodley and Edward Bell have shown, societies with high rates of cousin marriage exhibit lower levels of democracy. Why? Unions between close relatives foster kinship networks that are socially and genetically isolated from the broader population. This restricts both gene flow and social interaction, promoting in-group loyalty at the expense of national cohesion. Since individuals are more concerned with their extended family than with the country as a whole, democracy falters.

Cousin marriage is a special case of the more general phenomenon of tribalism. In tribal societies, the state is not seen as a neutral arbiter or collective institution but as a prize to be captured by one or other ethnic faction. As Simplice Asongu and Oasis Kodila-Tedika demonstrate, there is a strong negative correlation between tribalism and government effectiveness. Instead of voting on the basis of policy platforms or ideology, individuals support tribal leaders who promise material benefits for their group. This erodes the idea of equal citizenship and transforms the democratic process into an ethnic census.

Which is not to say that democracy is necessarily undesirable. On the contrary, stable democracies are just about the best political systems we have. But for democracy to work well, the society must be ready. The population must be literate. The economy should be relatively advanced. There must be a coherent national identity. Where these things are absent, democracy is not a means of development but a distraction from it.

The uncomfortable truth is that many “democratic” governments lack any capacity to govern. Civil servants are underpaid or untrained, legal systems are overwhelmed or corrupt, and political institutions serve as patronage networks. Rather than treating mass democracy as a universal fix, the focus should be on stable and effective government.

Countries that achieve economic development do not begin with mass democracy. They end with it. The path forward is not to abandon democracy, but to recognize that mass democracy is the outcome of a gradual, long-term process. Promoting democratization may feel virtuous, but it often sets poor countries on the path of instability.

Lipton Matthews is a research professional and YouTuber. His work has been featured by the Mises Institute, The Epoch Times and Chronicles. He is the author of The Corporate Myth. You can reach him at: lo_matthews@yahoo.com

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