Excellent article (and the Huxley is good too, so thanks for that as well).
I have no idea whether this point is really five years away or will always be five years away. I hope it comes because I want to see it.
I'm also glad to learn that Wittgenstein has not been entirely refuted but rather built upon. It seems like Wittgenstein's broadest ideas will still remain after this point arrives. It might not be understandable to us mere humans, but it will still exist for the machines (is my uneducated guess).
If a painting of an imaginary apple is done so accurately and competently that an observer can't tell it's not a photo of a real apple, does that mean that the painting is indeed of a real apple? When the Mechanical Turk fooled observers into thinking it was a machine rather than a human, does that mean that it really was only a machine and not human? If a trans-sexual uses make-up and clothing and practiced behaviours to successfully fool bystanders into thinking he is a woman, does that mean he really is a woman?
This is what is being claimed when people argue that an artificial simulation of thinking must be the result of real thinking just because the simulation is good enough to fool people. The success of a deception does not alter the subvenient reality.
I don't understand these sort of arguments. Seems like you're simply insisting that there's a difference between thought and a 'simulation' of a thought, without providing any actual evidence.
It is true for everything that a simulation or depiction of the thing is not the same as the thing. What evidence is needed for that other than the experience of living in reality, where that is true of everything, all the time? The map is not the territory. Or as Magritte might put it, Ceci n'est pas une pensée.
"It is true for everything that a simulation or depiction of the thing is not the same as the thing."
That's why I put 'simulation' in scare quotes. You haven't established that AI thought isn't simply a form of thought. You're simply asserting that it's different.
Excellent article (and the Huxley is good too, so thanks for that as well).
I have no idea whether this point is really five years away or will always be five years away. I hope it comes because I want to see it.
I'm also glad to learn that Wittgenstein has not been entirely refuted but rather built upon. It seems like Wittgenstein's broadest ideas will still remain after this point arrives. It might not be understandable to us mere humans, but it will still exist for the machines (is my uneducated guess).
If a painting of an imaginary apple is done so accurately and competently that an observer can't tell it's not a photo of a real apple, does that mean that the painting is indeed of a real apple? When the Mechanical Turk fooled observers into thinking it was a machine rather than a human, does that mean that it really was only a machine and not human? If a trans-sexual uses make-up and clothing and practiced behaviours to successfully fool bystanders into thinking he is a woman, does that mean he really is a woman?
This is what is being claimed when people argue that an artificial simulation of thinking must be the result of real thinking just because the simulation is good enough to fool people. The success of a deception does not alter the subvenient reality.
I don't understand these sort of arguments. Seems like you're simply insisting that there's a difference between thought and a 'simulation' of a thought, without providing any actual evidence.
It is true for everything that a simulation or depiction of the thing is not the same as the thing. What evidence is needed for that other than the experience of living in reality, where that is true of everything, all the time? The map is not the territory. Or as Magritte might put it, Ceci n'est pas une pensée.
"It is true for everything that a simulation or depiction of the thing is not the same as the thing."
That's why I put 'simulation' in scare quotes. You haven't established that AI thought isn't simply a form of thought. You're simply asserting that it's different.
“Magritte hasn't established that a painted pipe isn't simply a form of pipe. He's simply asserting that it's different.”
Still haven't shown that the analogy applies. Simply repeating the assertion doesn't make it any less bald.