Britain's wealth was not built on slavery

It should not pay reparations.

Written by Lipton Matthews.

Sir Lenny Henry’s recent declaration that Britain owes Black Britons and Caribbean nations £18 trillion in reparations for slavery, a figure derived from the Brattle Report, has reignited debate about the origins of Britain’s wealth. Sir Lenny and his ilk claim that the Empire was built on the exploitation of enslaved Africans. Yet the historical record tells a different story. Britain’s economic transformation began long before the slave trade, and it was sustained not by colonial extraction but by productivity growth, financial institutions and an intellectual culture focussed on real-world problems.

From as early as the 13th century, England enjoyed economic growth well above that of a subsistence-based medieval society. Between 1270 and 1700, per capita income grew by approximately 0.2 percent a year, enough to more than double living standards before the onset of industrialization. Although pre-industrial growth was episodic, the English economy was far from stagnant.

After the Black Death, high real wages and abundant land led to a diet rich in meat and dairy. Meanwhile, labor scarcity encouraged innovation and investment in equipment. Agriculture itself became increasingly capital-intensive, emphasizing livestock rather than grain production. By the Early Modern period, England’s economy had become significantly diversified, with growing towns, specialized crafts and substantial trade — both foreign and domestic.

Productivity statistics confirm this pattern. While total factor productivity remained relatively constant until around 1600, it subsequently grew at an average rate of 3 percent a decade until 1760. Crucially, this acceleration occurred before the expansion of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the mid 1600s. It stemmed from improved use of capital, better organization of production, and the shift from agriculture to industry and services. Importantly, the ruling elite did not block innovation; nor were they controlled by narrow interests. Their policies fostered an environment in which technological and organizational experimentation could thrive. Britain’s ascent was therefore endogenous — the product of internal transformation.

Financial institutions played a central role. Western Europe, and England in particular, diverged from the rest of the world by developing formal systems of business organization. The introduction of double-entry bookkeeping in late-medieval Italy revolutionized commerce by allowing merchants to track credit and debit precisely. England adopted and expanded this system, applying it to manufacturing and, later, finance.

The rise of joint-stock companies and limited liability during the 17th century transformed economic life by enabling investors to pool capital and spread risk. This made large ventures possible, including major infrastructure projects. By contrast, China and other non-Western societies relied on kin-based networks for commerce, which limited scalability and curtailed the market development. England’s financial innovations boosted interpersonal trust, creating an economy governed by contracts, rather than lineage and reputation. This, in turn, created the administrative skeleton of modern capitalism.

Closely linked to these institutional developments was an intellectual revolution. The Enlightenment, building on the Baconian program of “useful knowledge,” redefined the relationship between scholarly thought and material progress. Knowledge ceased to be an end in itself and became a tool for human improvement.

This trend distinguished Europe from civilizations where bursts of innovation faded because they lacked mechanisms to preserve and expand knowledge. In England, institutions like the Royal Society fostered collaboration between scientists, engineers and craftsmen, ensuring that new discoveries circulated widely. Ideas spread from intellectuals to inventors and from inventors to intellectuals, creating a feedback loop between theory and practice. Once knowledge was institutionalized, England’s growth ceased to depend on chance and became cumulative.

The English apprenticeship system is a case in point. While France cultivated theoreticians through state academies, England emphasized learning from experience. Apprentices mastered skills through observation and imitation, developing practical insights and “scientific” habits. This model of “learning by doing” encouraged experimentation, adaptation and continuous improvement. Skilled workers were not merely artisans but innovators capable of modifying tools, engines and production techniques. Consequently, England did not simply invent things — it commercialized them. Technologies diffused across industries, turning local insights into widespread productivity gains.

It was this culture of empiricism and quantification that shaped how Britain later organized the slave trade. The trade was not a product of British institutions so much as a byproduct of their sophistication. Colonial merchants extended domestic financial instruments to the slave trade, applying the same principles of accountability and risk management that they would have applied to any commercial venture.

Initially, slave voyages were financially precarious. Ships’ captains were often paid with planters’ promissory notes, merchants’ IOUs, or shipments of sugar and rum. Payments depended on unpredictable harvests, leaving traders financially vulnerable. To stabilize the system, British bankers introduced “bills in the bottom,” bills guaranteed by the ship and its cargo that could later be exchanged for cash in London’s financial markets. This innovation helped to integrate slavery into England’s broader financial system. The formalisation of a morally abhorrent trade into a contractual, insurable and liquid enterprise underscores how advanced English business institutions had become.

The insurance sector illustrates this clearly. During the 1790s, slave voyages accounted for about seven percent of British marine insurance contracts, while the slave and West Indies trades together accounted for approximately 41 percent. Insurers treated slavery as a simple matter of business: premiums were determined by route, cargo and risk — as in other maritime ventures. And the trade did not enrich the insurance industry to a greater extent than any other part of maritime commerce. All this demonstrates the scope of rational thinking within England at the time. Business was governed by law and actuarial mathematics, not moral sentiment.

The rational thinking that made the slave trade insurable also powered industrialization. The same institutions that managed risk in trans-Atlantic commerce financed canals, factories and steam engines back at home. The country’s wealth arose from the disciplined use of reason and evidence in every sphere of activity — from science to business to governance.

While Britain roared ahead, Africa lagged behind. The trans-Saharan slave trade, which predated the Atlantic system by over a millennium, persisted for centuries without generating much institutional development. This was surely because it wasn’t organized along scientific lines. (European traders even read documents discussing the health of slaves and the logistics of transportation.)

Yet within Africa, regions with stronger institutions achieved a measure of economic success. Nowhere is this more evident than Bonny’s replacement of Old Calabar as the principal slave port on the Bight of Biafra in the 18^th century. Though Bonny was known to be worse for the health of Europeans, it rose to prominence because the state there proved remarkably effective at enforcing credit arrangements. Today, Africa remains the poorest continent, and is falling further behind the West. The absence of strong institutions has only compounded problems like low test scores and superstitious beliefs.

In contrast, Black Britons and Caribbean nations (the groups Sir Lenny believes should get reparations) already benefit from preferential arrangements. In Britain, leading universities such as Bristol provide scholarships specifically for Black students. Black Britons also benefit from subsidised education, free healthcare and stable governance. (And they are overrepresented among users of universal credit.) Meanwhile, Caribbean nations receive development aid, trade preferences, and technical assistance from both the UK and the EU.

Indeed, Black Britons (as well as most Caribbean citizens) enjoy living standards far higher than the average African. To live in a Western country that is stable and reasonably prosperous is itself a form of reparation. After all, it grants participation in the very civilization whose knowledge systems created modern wealth.

Lipton Matthews is a research professional and YouTuber. His work has been featured by the Mises Institute and Chronicles. He is the author of The Corporate Myth. You can reach him at: lo_matthews@yahoo.com

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